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PRIOR CRIMES AS EVIDENCE
IN PRESENT CRIMINAL TRIALS
By CHARLES W. GAMBLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The accused's criminal history is agreed to be one of the most
influential types of evidence. Unrelated criminal misconduct for
which the accused has or has not been convicted has an inestimable
effect upon the minds of the jurors. Perhaps no evidence is more
helpful to the prosecution or harmful to the defense. This evidence
is of such importance that the defense attorney and prosecutor con-
tinually and justifiably are concerned about its admissibility.
This article is a discussion of the instances when criminal acts
of the accused, occurring both prior and subsequent to the now-
charged crime, are admissible in a present criminal prosecution.
Instances when criminal history gains admission are divided into
two categories: admissibility regardless of the trial tactics of the
defense and admissibility due to the trial tactics of the defense. The
principles of evidence stated in the article are North Carolina rules
with frequent footnote reference to the corresponding Federal Rules
of Evidence.
A major obstacle to a clear understanding of the rules governing
the use of criminal history lies in the fact that they are part of one
of the most elusive and misunderstood areas within the subject of
evidence-character. Few cases arise in which the attorney is not
concerned with whether character is at issue and, if it is, what form
of evidence is admissible to prove it. In our evidentiary system,
character historically has been proven in one of several forms: repu-
tation, specific acts and opinion.' This article deals only with char-
acter in the form of specific acts.
* J.D., University of Alabama, LL.M., Harvard Law School. Professor of Law
at Cumberland School of Law. #
1. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 186 (2d ed.
1972); 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1980-1986 (3d ed. 1940); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 1608-1621 (Chadbourn rev. 1974); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 191-213 (3d ed.
1940).
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II. GENERAL EXCLUSIONARY RULE
We begin on the criminal side with a general exclusionary rule
which precludes the prosecution in its case in chief from taking the
initiative to introduce evidence of the accused's bad character to
prove that he acted in keeping therewith on the occasion in ques-
tion.2 A major application of this character evidence rule renders
inadmissible any evidence of the commission of other independent
and unrelated crimes or offenses when offered to prove the accused
guilty of the now-charged crime.3 There are differences of opinion
as to the basic justification for this exclusionary rule, but the follow-
ing is an excellent summary of all such justifications:
Proof that a defendant has been.guilty of another crime equally
heinous prompts to a ready acceptance of and belief in the prosecu-
tion's theory that he is guilty of the crime charged. Its effect is to
predispose the mind of the juror to believe the prisoner guilty, and
thus effectually to strip him of the presumption of innocence ...
Furthermore, it is clear that evidence of other crimes compels the
defendant to meet charges of which the indictment gives him no
information, confuses him in his defense, raises a variety of issues,
and thus diverts the attention of the jury from the charge immedi-
ately before it. The rule may be said to be an application of the
principle that the evidence must be confined to the point in issue
in the case on trial.4
This rule of exclusion precludes the admission of distinct, inde-
pendent or separate offenses when their only relevance is to show
the character of the defendant or his disposition to commit an of-
fense similar to the one for which he is on trial.5 If, however, the
evidence of other offenses tends to prove any other relevant fact, it
will not be excluded merely because it also shows that he was guilty
of an independent crime.6 The philosophy is that character evidence
is inadmissible when offered by the prosecution to prove that the
accused was of a particular character and acted in keeping with that
character on the occasion in question. However, the rule does not
2. State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338 (1978); State v. Jarrette, 284
N.C. 625, 202 S.E.2d 721 (1974), vacated in part, 428 U.S. 903 (1976).
3. State v. Patterson, 284 N.C. 190, 200 S.E.2d 16 (1973); State v. Austin, 31
N.C. App. 20, 228 S.E.2d 507 (1976); State v. Foster, 27 N.C. App. 531, 219 S.E.2d
535 (1975).
4. State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954) (leading case enunci-
ating the exclusionary rule and its exceptions).
5. State v. Felton, 283 N.C. 368, 196 S.E.2d 239 (1973); State v. Gainey, 32
N.C. App. 682, 233 S.E.2d 671, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 732, 235 S.E.2d 786 (1977);
State v. Harvey, 26 N.C. App. 716, 217 S.E.2d 88 (1975).
6. State v. Cates, 293 N.C. 462, 238 S.E.2d 465 (1977); State v. Bishop, 293
N.C. 84, 235 S.E.2d 214 (1977) (admissible if it tends to prove any relevant fact
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preclude character evidence when it is offered for some other pur-
pose. This gap in the general exclusionary rule has given rise to a
group of purposes on the criminal side for which the courts have
admitted character evidence in the form of the accused's prior spe-
cific criminal acts. One of the best expressions of this principle is
found in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) which reads:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conform-
ity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
In their mental struggles to determine whether evidence of the
accused's commission of another crime is admissible for a purpose
other than tending to show guilt via bad character, the appellate
courts, in numerous opinions, have set forth a list of the various
purposes for which evidence of this nature is admissible. Although
it would be impossible to compile a complete list of the purposes for
which an accused's commission of another crime is admissible, an
effort will be made in the following sections to set forth what seem
to be the principal purposes for which proof of prior criminal acts
has been held admissible.
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF CRIMINAL HISTORY
REGARDLESS OF TRIAL TACTICS
EMPLOYED BY THE DEFENSE
This portion of the article discusses those purposes for which
the prosecution may take the initiative, even in its case in chief, to
introduce other criminal acts of the accused. Clearly these acts may
be elicited through cross-examination of the accused, but the thrust
of this section is that they do not have to be thus elicited. The
prosecution without regard to any tactical maneuvers of the defense
may introduce this evidence through the testimony of its own wit-
nesses. For example, the defense cannot preclude the admission of
this evidence by preventing the accused from taking the witness
stand or by failing to call character witnesses in his behalf.
A. KNOWLEDGE
One of the common "other purposes" for which the prosecution
other than character of accused); State v. Collins, 35 N.C. App. 250, 241 S.E.2d
98 (1978) (if evidence of another crime reasonably tends to prove a material fact
in issue, then such is admissible even if it incidentally shows that defendant is
guilty of another crime).
19791
3
Gamble: Prior Crimes as Evidence in Present Criminal Trials
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1979
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
may introduce prior specific acts is to prove knowledge.' Evidence
of the accused's commission of another crime or act is admissible if
his knowledge of a certain fact is an element of the now-charged
crime and his commission of that other crime or act is relevant to
give rise to the inference that he possesses the prerequisite knowl-
edge.
The present exception has its most active application in state
prosecutions for the crime of receiving stolen property. This crime
requires as a prerequisite mental element that the defendant had
knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe that the goods were
stolen. The state may introduce prior instances of the defendant's
receiving other stolen property to infer his knowledge or reasonable
belief.8 This element also may be proven by the accused's subse-
quent purchase of other stolen property? Other instances of the
defendant's having received stolen property are admissible even
though the stolen property received on the other occasions was not
similar in kind to the property described in the indictment. Admis-
sibility of this evidence also will not be affected where the property
received on the other occasions was stolen from a different owner
than the property mentioned in the indictment."
A common application of the present exception on the federal
level is found in cases involving the crime of transporting stolen
vehicles across state lines." Prior specific acts which are relevant to
prove the prerequisite knowledge are admissible in the prosecution
of such a crime.
7. See State v. Lash, 21 N.C. App. 365, 204 S.E.2d 563, appeal dismissed, 285
N.C. 593, 206 S.E.2d 865 (1974); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 301, 310, 324 (3d ed.
1940).
8. State v. Gregory, 32 N.C. App. 762, 233 S.E.2d 623 (crime of receiving
stolen goods knowing them to be stolen; court admitted fact that, two weeks before
receiving the cigarettes in question, the accused had received a delivery of ciga-
rettes at 2:00 a.m. and had loaded and left with them by 3:00 a.m.; admitted to
show prerequisite knowledge), cert. denied, 292 N.C. 732, 236 S.E.2d 702 (1977);
Annot., 105 A.L.R. 1288 (1936) (admissibility, in prosecution for receiving stolen
property, of evidence of other transactions for purpose of showing guilty knowl-
edge).
9. State v. Newton, 25 N.C. App. 277, 212 S.E.2d 700 (1975) (prosecution for
receiving stolen goods and conspiracy to receive stolen goods; court admitted evi-
dence that on subsequent occasion an undercover agent sold accused goods de-
scribed as "hot").
10. State v. Lindsey, 25 N.C. App. 343, 213 S.E.2d 434 (court admitted unre-
lated acts of receiving stolen goods as admissible to prove guilty knowledge), cert.
denied, 287 N.C. 468, 215 S.E.2d 627 (1975).
11. United States v. Brand, 79 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1935) (knowingly transporting
stolen car in interstate commerce; evidence of previous sale of a stolen car), cert.
denied,, 296 U.S. 655 (1936); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 301 (3d ed. 1940).
[Vol. 1:1
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B. INTENT
Where the accused is charged with a crime that requires a spe-
cific prerequisite intent, prior criminal acts are admissible to show
that he had the necessary intent when he committed the now-
charged crime." One of the better statements of this exception is
expressed in the comprehensive decision, State v. McClain:'3
"Where a specific mental intent or state is an essential element of
the crime charged, evidence may be offered of such acts. . . of the
accused as tend to establish the requisite mental intent or state,
even though the evidence discloses the commission of another of-
fense by the accused."
This exception to the general exclusionary rule arises only in
those prosecutions for crimes which require a specific intent-as op-
posed to a general intent. Although it can be said that all crimes
require some sort of mental element, the present exception becomes
available only when successful prosecution requires proof of a spe-
cific intent. Specific intent, as distinguished from general intent,
refers to a special mental element beyond that required by the actus
reus of the crime.'4 Illustrative examples of the application of this
exception to the general rule excluding prior crimes are found in
cases involving larceny,'" possession of illegal drugs with intent to
sell'" or distribute," assault with intent to rape,' 8 obtaining property
12. State v. May, 292 N.C. 644, 235 S.E.2d 178 (accused charged with murder
committed in course of attempted robbery; court admitted evidence of prior rob-
bery, under similar circumstances, as relevant to issue of whether accused had
intent to rob), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928 (1977); State v. Sink, 31 N.C. App. 726,
230 S.E.2d 435 (1976).
13. State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 175, 81 S.E.2d 364, 366;(1954).
14. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw § 28, at 202
(1972).
15. State v. Stancill, 178 N.C. 683, 100 S.E. 241 (1919) (other tobacco steal-
ings admissible to prove intent in larceny); State v. Sink, 31 N.C. App. 726, 230
S.E.2d 435 (1976) (intent to steal).
16. State v. Richardson, 36 N.C. App. 373, 243 S.E.2d 918 (1978) (possession
of marijuana with intent to sell and deliver; undercover agent allowed to testify of
previously going to accused's house and purchasing marijuana).
17. State v. Mitchell, 27 N.C. App. 313, 219 S.E.2d 295 (1975) (witness al-
lowed to testify to suspicious items and paraphernalia found in accused's home),
cert. denied, 289 N.C. 301, 222 S.E.2d 701 (1976).
18. State v. Greene, 294 N.C. 418, 241 S.E.2d 662 (1978); State v. Leak, 156
N.C. 643, 72 S.E. 567 (1911).
1979]
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by false pretense with intent to defraud 9 and assault with intent to
kill.2
C. MOTIVE
Since motive is often difficult to distinguish from intent and
knowledge, they frequently are discussed as one category. However,
the better-reasoned decisions appear to separate these three mental
states. One author defines motive as that state of mind which works
to supply "the reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to
indulge the criminal intent."'" Evidence of the accused's commis-
sion of another crime is admissible if it tends to show a motive to
commit the now-charged crime.22 This exception to the general ex-
clusionary rule has its most active application in cases where the
accused is being tried for homicide and the relevant motive is mal-
ice.23 Decisions in these cases have held proper the proof of: the
accused's prior assaults on the victim as indicative of his motive to
kill, 2 the accused's commission of a previous crime when a reason-
able inference exists that he committed the now-charged homicide
for the purpose of escaping arrest and conviction for the previous
crime25 and the accused's commission of another crime when the
19. State v. Cruse, 253 N.C. 456, 117 S.E.2d 49 (1960); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d
1359 (1951) (admissibility to establish fraudulent purpose or intent, in prosecution
for obtaining or attempting to obtain money or property by false pretenses, of
evidence of similar attempts on other occasions).
20. State v. Tate, 294 N.C. 189, 239 S.E.2d 821 (1978) (prior threats and
assaults upon victim relevant to intent); State v. Benthall, 20 N.C. App. 167, 201
S.E.2d 34 (1973) (prior assaults upon victim admitted in prosecution for felonious
assault with deadly weapon with intent to kill).
21. Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 6 KAN. L. REv. 38, 48 (1957).
22. State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954).
23. State v. Patterson, 288 N.C. 553, 220 S.E.2d 600 (1975) (murder by ac-
cused of his daughter; admission of accused's statement that he thought daughter-
victim had lied in earlier assault prosecution of accused), vacated in part, 428 U.S.
904 (1976); State v. Hamrick, 30 N.C. App. 143, 226 S.E.2d 404 (murder prosecu-
tion; court admitted evidence of joint robbery by defendant and victim along with
evidence that victim was spending large sums of money; such went to show motive
in defendant), cert. denied, 290 N.C. 780, 229 S.E.2d 35 (1976).
24. Bennefield v. State, 281 Ala. 283, 202 So. 2d 55 (1967) (to show malice and
ill will toward deceased wife, State permitted to prove prior threats by the defen-
dant against his wife); see C. GAMBLE, MCELROY'S ALABAMA EVIDENCE § 70.01(12)(e)
(3d ed. 1977).
25. State v. Hyatt, 32 N.C. App. 623, 233 S.E.2d 649 (State introduced state-
ments by accused that he and victim previously had committed a crime and he
was afraid victim would testify against him), cert. denied, 292 N.C. 733, 235 S.E.2d
786 (1977).
[Vol. 1:1
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evidence warrants a reasonable inference that the accused commit-
ted the now-charged homicide for the purpose of concealing his
commission of the other crime.26
D. IDENTITY
The following is the most popularly cited statement of the
identity exception to the general rule which excludes evidence of
other crimes in present criminal trials:
Where the accused is not definitely identified as the perpetrator
of the crime charged and the circumstances tend to show that the
crime charged and another offense were committed by the same
person, evidence that the accused committed the other offense is
admissible to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime
charged. 7
All evidence tending to prove a person's guilt of the now-
charged crime may be said to identify him as the guilty person.
However, the identity exception to the general exclusionary rule is
more narrow and specific. It contemplates the situation where the
now-charged crime was committed in a novel and peculiar manner
and the state is allowed to show the accused's commission of other
similar offenses in order to prove that he is the perpetrator of the
now-charged crime.28 If, for example, the modus operandi employed
in the commission of a charged larceny were-novel or peculiar, the
state may prove that the accused committed other larcenies by the
same procedure in order to identify him as the perpetrator of the
charged larceny.29 The strongest statement in this regard is that the
prior crime and the now-charged crime must be shown to have pat-
26. State v. Williams, 292 N.C. 391, 233 S.E.2d 507 (1977) (proper to show that
state trooper was killed for the purpose of concealing another crime).
27. State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 175, 81 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1954). This
exception permits the admissibility of other crimes that are subsequent to as well
as prior to the now-charged crime. State v. McClain, 282 N.C. 357, 193 S.E.2d 108
(1972).
28. State v. Bishop, 293 N.C. 84, 235 S.E.2d 214 (1977); State v. Thompson,
290 N.C. 431, 226 S.E.2d 487 (1976) (previous rape offered to show identity in
present rape prosecution); State v. McClain, 282 N.C. 357, 193 S.E.2d 108 (1972)
(the accused was charged with rape, and police were allowed to testify to stopping
accused's car from which subsequently abducted rape victim fled; court observed
that the identity exception only becomes viable when there are similarities); State
v. Collins, 35 N.C. App. 250, 241 S.E.2d 98 (1978) (shoot out between accused and
sheriff admissible to show identity in prosecution for armed robbery).29. State v. Lindsey, 25 N.C. App. 343, 213 S.E.2d 434, cert. denied, 287 N.C.
468, 215 S.E.2d 627 (1975).
1979]
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ently obvious similarities. 0
Clearly a failure to apply this exception conservatively could
lead to an erosion of the general exclusionary rule. At least one court
has cautioned that this evidence should be subjected to rigid scru-
tiny.3' In addition to similarities in method, one decision indicates
that the now-charged crime and the other crimes must have proxim-
ity in place and time. 31
The identity exception to the general exclusionary rule only
becomes applicable when the identity of the person who committed
the now-charged crime is in issue.3 If, for example, the accused is
charged with carnal knowledge of his daughter who is under a cer-
tain age, the identity of the perpetrator usually will not be an issue
and the identity exception will not be viable.
E. COMMON PLAN OR SCHEME
Evidence of the accused's commission of another crime is ad-
missible if when considered with other evidence it warrants a find-
ing that both the now-charged crime and the other crime were com-
mitted in keeping with or pursuant to a single plan, design, scheme
or system. 34 This rule is applicable whether the scope of the plan,
design, scheme or system is narrow and specific or measurably
broad and general. Dean McCormick expressed the present rule as
authorizing admission of other crimes when offered "to prove the
existence of a larger continuing plan, scheme, or conspiracy, of
30. State v. Perry, 293 N.C. 97, 235 S.E.2d 52 (1977) (evidence of accused's
commission of prior robbery admitted to identify him as perpetrator of now-
charged robbery).
31. State v. Whitney, 26 N.C. App. 460, 216 S.E.2d 439 (1975).
32. State v. Tuggle, 284 N.C. 515, 201 S.E.2d 884 (1974).
33. State v. McClain, 282 N.C. 357, 193 S.E.2d 108 (1972) (in present rape
prosecution, victim testified that she could not identify her assailant); see 2 J.
WEINST.EIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 404(09) (1977) (stating that
where the defendant admits committing the act, and bases his defense on some
other ground, evidence of other crimes proffered to prove his identity should not
be adnitted).
34. State v. Duncan, 290 N.C. 741, 228 S.E.2d 237 (1976) (State permitted,
in prosecution for burglary, witnesses to testify as to their association with accused
in other breakings and enterings over a previous two-year period); State v. Grace,
287 N.C. 243, 213 S.E.2d 717 (1975) (armed robbery prosecution; three previous
robberies of similar establishments by same persons and with identical pistols
admitted as showing a scheme); State v. Stancill, 178 N.C. 683, 100 S.E. 241 (1919)
(plan was to plunder tobacco barns in the neighborhood); State v. Sink, 31 N.C.
App. 726, 230 S.E.2d 435 (1976) (prosecution for breaking and entering; evidence
of accused's breaking or entering other premises on same night).
[Vol. 1:1
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which the present crime on trial is a part. ' '35 Following is one of the
better judicial declarations of this rule in North Carolina:
Evidence of other crimes is admissible when it tends to establish
a common plan or scheme embracing the commission of a series
of crimes so related to each other that proof of one or more tends
to prove the crime charged and to connect the accused with its
commission. . . . Evidence of other crimes receivable under this
exception is ordinarily admissible under the other exceptions
which sanction the use of such evidence to show criminal intent,
guilty knowledge, or identity.30
It should be emphasized that this exception to the general exclu-
sionary rule becomes viable only when similarities between the
other crimes and the now-charged crime exist 7.3
This ground for admission of other crimes by the accused gains
particular importance in North Carolina because its viability also
determines when prosecutions of the accused for separate crimes
may properly be consolidated. The statute formulating such a test
for joinder provides that:
Two or more offenses may be joined in one pleading or for trial
when the offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are
based on the same act or transaction or on a series of acts or
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a single
scheme or plan [emphasis added].3
F. RES GESTAE or CONTINUOUS TRANSACTION
Evidence of the accused's commission of another crime is ad-
missible where the other crime is connected inseparably with or is
part of the res gestae of the presently charged crime. Often the two
crimes are said to be parts of one continuous criminal occurrence. 3
This exception may apply when the other crimes and the now-
35. E. CLEARY, supra note 1, § 190 at 448.
36. State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 176, 81 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1954).
37. State v. McClain, 282 N.C. 357, 193 S.E.2d 108 (1972).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-926(a) (1978); see State v. Greene, 294 N.C. 418,
241 S.E.2d 662 (1978) (sexual assaults on two women within time span of three
hours were parts of single scheme or plan within joinder statute).39. State v. Jones, 292 N.C. 513, 234 S.E.2d 555 (1977) (admitting accused's
attack on policeman during flight from prosecution for present crimes); State v.
Lowery, 286 N.C. 698, 213 S.E.2d 255 (1975) (rape prosecution; State allowed to
prove unnatural sex act committed by accused and a friend upon same victim soon
after the rape), vacated in part, 428 U.S. 902 (1976); State v. Washington, 283 N.C.
175, 195 S.E.2d 534 (1973) (victim allowed to testify in rape prosecution to a
subsequent rape by accused while she was still his captive), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1132 (1974); State v. Clark, 18 N.C. App. 621, 197 S.E.2d 605 (1973).
1979]
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charged crime are so connected by time or circumstance that one
cannot fully be shown without proving the other.4" Dean Wigmore
has explained the admission of other crimes under the present ex-
ception with:
Suppose that A is charged with stealing the tools of X; the evi-
dence shows that a box of carpenter's tools was taken, and that in
it were the tools of Y and Z as well as of X; here we are incidentally
proving the commission of two additional crimes, because they are
necessarily interwoven with the stealing charged, and together
form one deed."
G. PASSION OR PROPENSITY FOR ILLICIT SEXUAL RELATIONS
An accused who is being prosecuted for a sexual offense can
expect his other sexual misdeeds to be admitted more liberally than
nonsexual misconduct would be admitted in other types of prosecu-
tions. Originally courts employed a more expansive application of
the previously discussed exceptions to the general exclusionary rule
in order to achieve this liberality of admission. The Supreme Court
of North Carolina has recognized its own liberal approach in admit-
ting evidence of similar sex crimes in construing the exceptions to
the general rule. 2
Arguably, the courts at present are not only more liberal-
minded in permitting the admission of sexual misconduct under the
historic exceptions, but they actually have fashioned a new and
separate sex exception to the general exclusionary rule. Support for
this conclusion lies in the courts' suggestions that these admissions
have probative value to reveal the disposition, 43 unnatural lust,"
attitude45 and state of mind of the accused. 4 These decisions serve
40. State v. Poole, 289 N.C. 47, 220 S.E.2d 320 (1975) (accused charged with
.kidnapping and victim permitted to testify that accused also raped her as part of
the same transaction); State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954).
41. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 218 (3d ed. 1940).
42. State v. Greene, 294 N.C. 418, 423, 241 S.E.2d 662, 665 (1978); see Annot.,
77 A.L.R.2d 841 (1961) (admissibility, in prosecution for sexual offense, of evidence
of other similar offenses).
43. State v. Austin, 285 N.C. 364, 204 S.E.2d 675 (1974) (historic rule has been
to admit other incestuous intercourse between the prosecuting witness and defen-
dant during prosecution for incest); see 41 AM. Jun. 2d Incest § 17 (1968).
44. State v. Edwards, 224 N.C. 527, 31 S.E.2d 516 (1944); State v. Gainey, 32
N.C. App. 682, 233 S.E.2d 671 (prosecution for rape and crime against nature;
while recognizing admissibility of other similar acts to prove intent, the court
further stated that these other sex acts were relevant to show the defendant's
unnatural lust), cert. denied, 292 N.C. 732, 235 S.E.2d 786 (1977).
45. State v. Davis, 229 N.C. 386, 50 S.E.2d 37 (1948) (the defendant's attitude,
animus and purpose).
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as a basis upon which to arguethat it is permissible in a prosecution
for sexual misconduct to offer prior similar sex acts to show that the
accused has a propensity for illicit sexual relations. 7 Some states
have been rather direct in their adoption of such an exception while
others have proceeded indirectly, using the existing exceptions.4 8
It must be emphasized that any exception developed to admit
prior sexual misconduct works solely for the admission of such acts
when they are similar to those for which the accused is now being
tried and when they were committed with the particular person
involved in the current criminal prosecution." The present excep-
tion does not work to admit prior sexual acts which are dissimilar
or were committed with persons other than the victim of the present
prosecution." However, these may gain admission under one of the
other proper purposes which previously have been developed in this
section. 5'
H. DISPOSITION TO DEAL IN ILLEGAL DRUGS
The decisions, at the very least, reveal a liberality on the part
46. State v. Humphrey, 283 N.C. 570, 196 S.E.2d 516 (quo animo or state of
mind), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1042 (1973); State v. Forehand, 17 N.C. App. 287,
194 S.E.2d 157, cert. denied, 283 N.C. 107, 194 S.E.2d 635 (1973).
47. Woods v. State, 250 Ind. 132, 235 N.E.2d 479 (1968) (rape and incest; other
like acts on victims admissible to show "depraved sexual instinct"); see E. CLEARY,
supra note 1, at § 190.
48. See State v. McDaniel, 80 Ariz. 381, 298 P.2d 798 (1956) in which the court
observes:
Certain crimes today are recognized as stemming from a specific emo-
tional propensity for sexual aberration. The fact that in the near past one
has given way to unnatural proclivities has a direct bearing upon the
ultimate issue whether in the case being tried he is guilty of a particular
unnatural act of passion. The importance of establishing this fact far
outweighs the prejudicial possibility that the jury might convict for gen-
eral rather than specific criminality. Even granting the general rule of
inadmissibility of evidence of independent crimes to prove the offense
charged, many courts recognize a limited exception in the .area of sex
crimes to prove the nature of the accused's specific emotional propensity.
Id., at 388, 298 P.2d at 802.
49. State v. Schut, 71 Wash. 2d 400, 429 P.2d 126 (1967) (incest; prior acts
with victim admissible to show a lustful inclination toward the offended female).
50. Landon v. State, 77 Okla. Crim. 190, 140 P.2d 242 (1943) (statutory rape
on daughter; other offenses with another daughter on other occasions excluded);
State v. Williams, 36 Utah 273, 103 P. 250 (1909) (statutory rape).
51. State v. Greene, 294 N.C. 418, 241 S.E.2d 662 (1978) (assault with intent
to rape upon one woman admissible in case charging defendant with raping a
second woman; held to show defendant's intent); State v. Arnold, 284 N.C. 41, 91
S.E.2d 423 (1973); State v. Davis, 229 N.C. 386, 50 S.E.2d 37 (1948).
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of the courts in admitting other drug violations in a present drug
prosecution. 52 On the whole, this has been accomplished by taking
a liberal view of the traditional exceptions including: intent, com-
mon plan and scheme and knowledge.3 We have reached the point,
however, where it is not erroneous to suggest that a new and sepa-
rate exception exists for the admission of other drug violations at
least in a present prosecution for dealing in illegal drugs. The
breadth with which the North Carolina courts presently view the
admissibility of such evidence appears in the following language:
"In drug cases, evidence of other drug violations is relevant and
admissible if it tends to show plan or scheme, disposition to deal
in illicit drugs, knowledge of the presence and character of the drug,
or presence at and possession of the premises where the drugs are
found." 4
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF CRIMINAL HISTORY
DUE TO THE TRIAL TACTICS OF THE DEFENSE
This section is intended to catalogue and discuss those instan-
ces in which evidence of the accused's criminal history will be ad-
mitted solely because of some particular defense maneuver. The
message is that absent such a trial tactic by the accused this evi-
dence would be inadmissible unless it could be included within one
of the "other purposes" discussed in the previous section. The prin-
ciples discussed herein place upon the defense attorney the burden
of deciding whether the value gained by employment of the particu-
lar trial tactic outweighs the prejudicial effect of the criminal his-
tory thereby rendered admissible.
A. SPECIAL PLEAS AND DEFENSES
1. Entrapment
Special pleas and defenses are available which when asserted
by the accused place all or a limited portion of his character in issue.
The materiality of such character permits the prosecution to intro-
duce any other criminal acts which are relevant to prove it. A major
illustration of this principle is found in criminal prosecutions where
52. See State v. Logan, 22 N.C. App. 55, 205 S.E.2d 558, cert. denied, 285 N.C.
666, 207 S.E.2d 752 (1974); Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 1097 (1964) (admissibility, in
prosecution for illegal sale of narcotics, of evidence of other sales).
53. State v. Salame, 24 N.C. App. 1, 210 S.E.2d 77, (1974), cert. denied, 286
N.C. 419, 211 S.E.2d 800 (1975).
54. State v. Richardson, 36 N.C. App. 373, 375, 243 S.E.2d 918, 919 (1978)
(emphasis added).
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the accused invokes the defense of entrapment." The use of such a
defense has been held to place in issue the defendant's predisposi-
tion to commit the charged crime.5" This results in permitting the
prosecution to offer evidence of any other criminal violations if they
are probative of the accused's predisposition to engage in the partic-
ular misconduct with which he presently is charged." The bulk of
cases giving rise to this exception involve the violation of drug laws;
however, the exception would appear to be viable in other criminal
prosecutions.
2. Insanity
Character evidence in the form of prior specific acts often gains
admission in criminal cases upon the argument that it is relevant
to support or negate a plea of insanity. 8 The courts have adhered
to a wide-latitude rule relating to the admissibility of a criminally
accused's conduct when offered in support of his plea of insanity.
This wide latitude has encompassed many forms of conduct which
trial courts have held relevant to show his mental incapacity at the
time in issue.59
55. Entrapment as a viable defense, of course, requires more than mere invita-
tion or temptation by law enforcement officers. Rather, there must be proof that
the agent or officer induced the accused to commit a crime he would not have
committed but for the inducement. State v. Padgett, 29 N.C. App. 277, 224 S.E.2d
211 (1976); State v. Green, 27 N.C. App. 491, 219 S.E.2d 529 (1975).
56. State v. Salame, 24 N.C. App. 1, 210 S.E.2d 77 (1974) (prosecution fbr
felonious distribution of marijuana and cocaine; court admitted evidence of subse-
quent unrelated instances of accused's dispensing drugs; court stating that when
defense of entrapment is raised, defendant's predisposition to commit the charged
crime becomes the central inquiry), cert. denied, 286 N.C. 419, 211 S.E.2d 800
(1975). Note should be taken that if the particular jurisdiction adopts the Model
Penal Code, which provides for an objective test of entrapment, predisposition of
the particular defendant would not be material and prior crimes would not be
admissible upon that issue. See Langford v. Texas, 571 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978) (statute governing entrapment defense provides for "objective" test for
entrapment; and thus, having once determined that there was an inducement, trial
court need consider only nature of police activity involved, without reference to
predisposition of particular defendant to commit offense).
57. See State v. Stanley, 288 N.C. 19, 215 S.E.2d 589 (1975) (court holding to
rule that entrapment puts disposition in issue; however, court excluded conviction
of marijuana possession as irrelevant to show a disposition to possess LSD with
intent to distribute). This exception could have been discussed as rebuttal since
some decisions have admitted prior misconduct as evidence to rebut the accused's
defense of entrapment. See State v. Vallejos, 89 Ariz. 76, 358 P.2d 178 (1960).
58. See 2 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 228 (3d ed. 1940).
59. State v. Bundridge, 294 N.C. 45, 239 S.E.2d 811 (1978) (recognizing the
test of wide latitude in admitting evidence having a tendency to throw light upon
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This same wide-latitude rule has been applied in decisions re-
lating to admissibility of conduct and condition of the accused of-
fered by the state in opposition to his plea of insanity. 0 If an accused
who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity introduces evidence
which warrants a finding of such insanity, the state may introduce
evidence of the commission of other crimes and misdeeds by the
accused. Such evidence is held admissible to show that the criminal
act charged was not the offspring of a mental disease, but of a
wicked propensity.6 ' The power of the state to introduce evidence of
other crimes includes the right to introduce misdeeds of the accused
not amounting to a crime but having a tendency to prove his sanity.
Despite the application of the wide-latitude rule, the state does not
have the right to introduce evidence of all former crimes and mis-
deeds committed by the accused. The state may introduce only such
crimes and misdeeds when they reveal some action by the accused
that is relevant to his mental capacity.62
B. IMPEACHMENT
Whenever a party or nonparty witness takes the stand, a lim-
ited aspect of his character is placed in issue-his character for
telling the truth. This aspect of his character is referred to as
"credibility," and all evidence relevant to this particular trait and
to whether he is the kind of person who speaks the truth is admissi-
the mental condition of a defendant who has entered a plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity); State v. Duncan, 244 N.C. 374, 93 S.E.2d 421 (1956) (citing a Tennes-
see decision which held that evidence of his conduct and condition before, at the
time of and subsequent to the doing of the thing charged is admissible on question
of defendant's mental status at the time he did the thing complained of); State v.
Wells, 162 S.C. 509, 161 S.E. 177 (1931).
60. State v. Bundridge, 294 N.C. 45, 239 S.E.2d 811 (1978).
61. Reedy v. State, 246 Ala. 363, 20 So. 2d 528 (1945) (that accused, charged
with the commission of rape on February 11, 1944, stated that between the time of
his escape from an insane hospital on February 1, 1944, and February 11, 1944, he
had committed numerous purse snatchings and thefts and numerous assaults and
attempts to assault females to satisfy his lust); Grammer v. State, 239 Ala. 633,
196 So. 268 (1940) (that accused, who was charged with committing murder on
August 3, 1937, and claimed that he had been mentally deranged long prior to such
killing, was convicted on September 5, 1933, of assault with a weapon and sent-
enced to the penitentiary upon such conviction); see C. GAMBLE, MCELROY'S ALA-
BAMA EVIDENCE § 61.01(8) (3d ed. 1977).
62. See State v. Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E.2d 241 (1969) (holding that
evidence is only admissible if it bears such relation to the defendant's condition of
mind at the time of the alleged crime as to be worthy of consideration in respect
thereto); State v. Duncan, 244 N.C. 374, 93 S.E.2d 421 (1956); Farris v. Common-
wealth, 209 Va. 305, 163 S.E.2d 575 (1968).
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ble.1" This exception to the general exclusionary rule is applicable
whether the witness is a party in civil litigation or the accused in
criminal proceedings. 4
1. Prior Misconduct or Criminal Acts for
Which There Is a Conviction
The common law rendered one totally incompetent to serve as
a witness if he had been convicted of what were termed "infamous"
crimes.65 This rule of incompetency eventually was abandoned by
statute, but those statutes which abrogated it as a ground for incom-
petency retained it as permissible evidence for impeachment. They
provide that one may be impeached by evidence of his prior convic-
tion for a particular crime. The difficulty came in deciding which
crimes reflected upon one's believability. Some statutes provide
that only felonies" can be used, while others permit impeachment
by prior conviction for any crime." The majority of these statutes
have adopted the requirement that there can be impeachment only
by prior conviction of a crime involving "moral turpitude."68 Federal
Rule of Evidence 609 adopts two categories into which a conviction
may fall and thus qualify as permissible impeachment. If the prior
conviction was for a crime that (1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year or (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement, it may be used for impeachment purposes."
63. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3) (which declares impeachment to be an excep-
tion to the general exclusionary rule); E. CLEARY, supra note 1, at § 41; 3A J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 874 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
64. See C. GAMBLE, MCELROY'S ALABAMA EVIDENCE §§ 165.01(2), .01(4) (3d ed.
1977); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 890-891 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). It should be
noted that in strictly common law jurisdictions one may be prohibited from im-
peaching his own witness, but Federal Rule of Evidence 607 provides for impeach-
ment by all parties even the party who called the witness.
65. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 519 (3d ed. 1949); see E. CLEARY, supra note 1,
at § 43.
66. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1974); IDAHO CODE § 9-1209 (1948).
67. State v. Hurt, 49 N.J. 114, 228 A.2d 673 (1967); State v. Rios, 155 N.J.
Super. 11, 382 A.2d 82 (1977); see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-12 (West 1976) which
states:
For the purpose of affecting the credibility of any witness, his interest in
the result of the action, proceeding or matter or his conviction of any crime
may be shown by examination or otherwise, and his answers may be
contradicted by other evidence. Conviction of crime may be proved by the
production of the record thereof, but no conviction of an offender shall be
received in evidence against him in a civil action to prove the truth of the
facts upon which the conviction was based.
68. See C. GAMBLE, MCELROY'S ALABAMA EVIDENCE § 145.01 (3d ed. 1977).
69. FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
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Once the criminally accused takes the witness stand in North
Carolina, he has put his credibility in issue.70 Consequently, for the
limited purpose of impeachment the prosecution may cross-
examine the accused concerning his previous criminal convictions.'
Unlike the majority of jurisdictions, North Carolina permits inquiry
into a prior conviction for any crime.72 This position is maintained
in face of a national effort by the jurisdictions, whatever their indi-
vidual tests, to limit this method of impeachment to convictions for
crimes which are relevant to whether the accused tells the truth.
While the accused may be asked about prior convictions, he
may not be asked about charges short of a conviction.7 3 This limita-
tion on the prosecution's cross-examination does little to protect the
accused who testifies in his own behalf since the court's sustention
of a defense objection to a question about an accusation, arrest or
indictment fails to preclude the prosecutor from then simply asking
the accused if he committed the particular criminal misconduct.74
Another limitation upon the right of the prosecution to cross-
examine the accused with reference to his other criminal convictions
is the principle that his answers to such questions are conclusive. 5
This means that the record of his conviction cannot be offered as
evidence to contradict his answer." Much of the value to the ac-
cused afforded by the foregoing principle depreciates in light of a
companion rule that the prosecutor may continue to question the
70. State v. Thomas, 35 N.C. App. 198, 241 S.E.2d 128 (1978).
71. State v. McLean, 294 N.C. 623, 242 S.E.2d 814 (1978); State v. Finch, 293
N.C. 132, 235 S.E.2d 819 (1977); State v. Miller, 281 N.C. 70, 187 S.E.2d 729 (1972).
72. See Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 156 S.E.2d 265 (1967)
(any sort of criminal offense may be inquired about).
73. State v. Lester, 289 N.C. 239, 221 S.E.2d 268 (1976) (cannot ask,.about
prior criminal charges against him); State v. Curry, 288 N.C. 660, 220 S.E.2d 545
(1975) (impermissible to ask accused if he has been accused, indicted or arrested
for an unrelated criminal offense).
74. This is permitted as impeachment by prior criminal misconduct for which
there has been no conviction. See State v. Allen, 34 N.C. App. 260, 237 S.E.2d 869,
cert. denied, 293 N.C. 741, 241 S.E.2d 516 (1977); State v. Crawford, 29 N.C. App.
487, 224 S.E.2d 680 (1976); State v. Logan, 22 N.C. App. 55, 205 S.E.2d 558 (court
indicating it permissible to ask accused about prior crime for which he is under
indictment, provided the prosecution does not mention the word indictment), cert.
denied, 285 N.C. 666, 207 S.E.2d 752 (1974).
75. State v. Finch, 293 N.C. 132, 235 S.E.2d 819 (1977); State v. Redfern, 13
N.C. App. 230, 185 S.E.2d 6 (1971), cert. denied, 280 N.C. 304, 186 S.E.2d 177
(1972).
76. State v. Currie, 293 N.C. 523, 238 S.E.2d 477 (1977); State v. Heard, 262
N.C. 599, 138 S.E.2d 243 (1964); State v. Blue, 17 N.C. App. 526, 195 S.E.2d 104
(1973) (answer could not be rebutted by other evidence).
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accused about his prior unrelated criminal convictions after an ini-
tial denial." In the words of the North Carolina Supreme Court, this
continued inquiry is allowed for the purpose of "sifting" the wit-
ness."8 This right of the prosecutor to pursue the witness is limited
only by boundaries of good faith79 and trial court discretion."
Strong policy reasons support the principle that ordinarily one
may not go into the details of the crime by which the witness is
being impeached. Such details unduly distract the jury from the
issues properly before it, harass the witness and inject confusion into
the trial.8" However, inquiry is allowed into the time and place of
the conviction and the punishment imposed."2
Even though the particular crime for which the witness was
convicted meets the appropriate test of the jurisdiction, it may be
excluded for other reasons. Some decisions, for example, preclude a
prior conviction based upon the violation of a municipal ordinance.13
Other decisions, customarily acting under statutory authority, have
held that prior criminal convictions are inadmissible for impeach-
ment purposes if those convictions arose in juvenile proceedings. 4
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 essentially adopts this position of
77. State v. Garrison, 294 N.C. 270, 240 S.E.2d 377 (1978) (witness' denial of
conviction does not per se preclude further cross with reference thereto); State v.
Allen, 34 N.C. App. 260, 237 S.E.2d 869, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 741, 241 S.E.2d
516 (1977); State v. Jeffries, 3 N.C. App. 218, 164 S.E.2d 398 (1968).
78. State v. Currie, 293 N.C. 523, 238 S.E.2d 477 (1977); State v. Gaiten, 277
N.C. 236, 176 S.E.2d 778 (1970).
79. State v. Fountain, 282 N.C. 58, 191 S.E.2d 674 (1972) (cross-examination
as to prior convictions must be made in good faith and based on information).
Whether there is information and good faith is a matter left largely in the trial
judge's discretion. See State v. Curry, 288 N.C. 660, 220 S.E.2d 545 (1975) (good
faith); State v. Gaiten, 277 N.C. 236, 176 S.E.2d 778 (1970); State v. Haith, 7 N.C.
App. 552, 172 S.E.2d 912 (1970).
80. State v. Monk, 291 N.C. 37, 229 S.E.2d 163 (1976); State v. Campbell, 20
N.C. App. 281, 201 S.E.2d 33 (1973); State v. Adams, 16 N.C. App. 640, 192 S.E.2d
648 (1972).
81. State v. Finch, 293 N.C. 132, 235 S.E.2d 819 (1977).
82. State v. Mitchell, 35 N.C. App. 95, 239 S.E.2d 871 (1978) (allowing inquiry
as to punishment imposed); see Annot., 67 A.L.R.3d 775 (1975) (propriety, on
impeaching credibility of witness in criminal case by showing former conviction,
relating to nature and extent of punishment).
83. Baker v. State, 344 So. 2d 547 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977); Birmingham v.
Evans, 53 Ala. App. 358, 300 So. 2d 396 (Crim. App.), cert. denied, 293 Ala. 136,
300 So. 2d 401 (1974).
84. Crenshaw v. Alabama Freight, Inc., 287 Ala. 372, 252 So. 2d 33 (1971);
Mayton v. State, 52 Ala. App. 626, 296 So. 2d 249 (Crim. App. 1974); see C.
GAMBLE, MCELROY'S ALABAMA EVIDENCE § 145.01(4) (3d ed. 1977).
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excluding juvenile convictions when offered for impeachment. 8
However, the Federal Rule will permit impeachment by juvenile
conviction in a certain limited situation. If the judge decides it is
necessary for a fair determination of guilt or innocence, he may
admit evidence in a criminal trial of a juvenile adjudication of a
witness other than the accused where the conviction would be ad-
missible to attack the credibility of an adult. 6 The corresponding
rule in North Carolina is that a witness may be cross-examined for
impeachment purposes concerning a juvenile court adjudication
where the conduct upon which the disposition was based would be
deemed "criminal" if committed by an adult. 7
The party attempting to impeach a particular witness often
offers a prior criminal conviction thatoccurred a considerable time
before the present trial. The party who called the witness.may argue
that the conviction is too remote to have probative value upon
whether the witness tells the truth today. Historically, this issue has
been left to the discretion of the trial judge and is said to go more
to the weight of the evidence than to its admissibility. 8 The Federal
85. FED. R. EVID. 609(d); see United States v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.
1975) (state youthful offender adjudication held normally inadmissible to attack
credibility of a defendant), cert. denied, sub nom, Begnigno v. United States, 423
U.S. 1059 (1976); Annot., 39 A.L.R. Fed. 570 (1978) (construction and application
of Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence permitting impeachment of-witness
by evidence of prior conviction of crime).
86. FED. R. EVID. 609(d); see E. CLEARY, supra note 1, at § 43 (the federal rule
does not preclude the use of a juvenile conviction to impeach a non-accused witness
if the crime either carried punishment of more than one year in jail or involved
dishonesty and false statement).
87. State v. Miller, 281 N.C. 70, 187 S.E.2d 729 (1972); State v. Tuttle, 28
N.C. App. 198, 220 S.E.2d 630 (1975), cert. denied, 291 N.C. 716, 232 S.E.2d 207
(1977); see Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 1112 (1975) (use of judgment in prior juvenile court
proceeding to impeach credibility of witness). An interesting question in this area,
for which present purposes do not permit exhaustive treatment is: What effect
upon this method of impeachment will be wrought by statutes which permit the
criminal record to be expunged? One such statute exists in North Carolina and,
relative to people not over twenty-one years who are found to possess a controlled
substance, provides that:
No person as to whom such order [expungment] has been entered shall
be held thereafter under any provision of any law to be guilty of perjury
. . . by reason of his failures to recite or acknowledge such arrest, or
indictment or information, or trial in response to any inquiry made of him
for any purpose.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-96(b) (1973).
88. State v. Bullock, 28 N.C. App. 1, 220 S.E.2d 169 (1975), cert. denied, 289
N.C. 299, 222 S.E.2d 699 (1976); State v. Locklear, 26 N.C. App. 300, 215 S.E.2d
859, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 248, 217 S.E.2d 672 (1975); see United States v. Hild-
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Rules of Evidence drift away from this discretionary position to an
arbitrary ten-year time limit beyond which the conviction is too
remote."
Other grounds for arguing the exclusion of convictions which
otherwise qualify as proper impeachment arise out of the status of
the conviction. Under the majority rule in this country, for exam-
ple, the position has been that pardon does not prevent the use of
the conviction for impeachment.9 However, the Federal Rules pro-
vide:
Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate
of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding
of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has
not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction
has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of innocence.2
The traditional rule and that adopted by the Federal Rules9 3 has
been that pendency of an appeal from the conviction does not render
it inadmissible for impeachment.4
reth, 387 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1967); Annot., 67 A.L.R.3d 824 (1975) (right to impeach
credibility of accused by showing prior conviction, as affected by remoteness in
time of prior offense).
89. FED. R. EVID. 609(b) provides:
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the
release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests
of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific
fact and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
However, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated
herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party
sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evi-
dence.
90. See State v. Vincent, 35 N.C. App. 369, 241 S.E.2d 390 (1978) (impermissi-
ble to impeach with conviction arising where accused was indigent and afforded
no legal counsel).
91. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 980 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (stating that,
unless otherwise expressly declared therein, a pardon does not imply a finding of
the innocence of the person convicted); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 893 (1953) (pardon as
affecting impeachment by proof of conviction of crime).
92. FED. R. EVID. 609(c).
93. FED. R. EVID. 609(e).
94. State v. Waller, 11 N.C. App. 434, 181 S.E.2d 195 (court recognizing that
accused has right to apprise jury that the conviction is on appeal), cert. denied,
1979]
19
Gamble: Prior Crimes as Evidence in Present Criminal Trials
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1979
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
2. Prior Misconduct or Criminal Acts for
Which There Is No Conviction
Any witness, including the criminally accused, may be im-
peached by his prior criminal acts or misconduct for which there has
been no conviction. 5 Impeachment by prior non-convicted miscon-
duct may be accomplished only through the testimony of the wit-
ness being impeached." If the witness denies that he ever commit-
ted the act or engaged in the misconduct, the impeaching party is
bound by his answer. 7 This latter rule prohibiting extrinsic proof is
probably a concession to those holding to the philosophy that one
should not be allowed to even ask about prior misconduct where
there was no conviction for it."
279 N.C. 351, 182 S.E.2d 584 (1971); see Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 726 (1967) (permissi-
bility of impeaching credibility of witness by showing former conviction, as affected
by pendency of appeal from conviction); Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1272 (1967) (permissi-
bility of impeaching credibility of witness by showing verdict of guilty without
judgment or sentence thereon).
95. State v. Garrison, 294 N.C. 270, 240 S.E.2d 377 (1978) (any act tending to
impeach his character); State v. Bishop, 293 N.C. 84, 235 S.E.2d 214 (1977); State
v. McKenna, 289 N.C. 668, 224 S.E.2d 537, vacated in part, 429 U.S. 912 (1976);
see 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 987 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
96. See State v. Currie, 293 N.C. 523, 238 S.E.2d 477 (1977); State v. Gaiten,
277 N.C. 236, 176 S.E.2d 778 (1970); FED. R. EVID. 608(b) ("Specific instances of
the conduct of a witness, for purposes of attacking or supporting his credibility,
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence."); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 981 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
97. State v. Garrison, 294 N.C. 270, 240 S.E.2d 377 (1978) (even after denial,
the prosecutor may, at trial court's discretion, further "sift" the accused witness
as to his prior misconduct); State v. Currie, 293 N.C. 523, 238 S.E.2d 477 (1977).
98. Christie v. Brewer, 374 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Sparks v. State,
366 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963); IDAHO CODE § 9-1302 (1948) (exemplifies
a state statute forbidding cross-examination as to acts of misconduct for impeach-
ment); E. CLEARY, supra note 1, at § 42 (minority of jurisdictions forbid all cross-
examination as to particular misconduct not the subject of convictions). There are
recognizable dangers in allowing this method of impeachment. For example, what
is to prevent the unscrupulous cross-examiner from thinking of a horrible act,
relevant to credibility, and asking the witness if he committed it? The majority rule
permitting such cross-examination is based upon the belief that such an abuse will
be prevented by the ethical discretion of the bar and by the trial judge's requiring
some basis for a belief by the cross-examiner that the witness actually committed
the prior act. See United States v. Crippen, 570 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing
judge's inquiry into whether counsel had a good faith basis for the question); 3A J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 983 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). North Carolina solves this prob-
lem by requiring that the prosecutor be proceeding with information and in good
faith when asking about such misconduct. State v. McLean, 294 N.C. 623, 242
S.E.2d 814 (1978); State v. Garrison, 294 N.C. 270, 240 S.E.2d 377 (1978); State v.
Foster, 293 N.C. 674, 239 S.E.2d 449 (1977) (holding that prosecutor must have
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Some division has existed through the years over what kind of
act will qualify under this exception for impeachment purposes.
Some have limited the exception to conduct relevant to veracity, "
while others have required relevancy to veracity and honesty.'"" The
Federal Rules of Evidence go further and require that the specific
act must be clearly probative of the witness' truthfulness or un-
truthfulness.' 0 ' North Carolina has taken the approach that the
prosecutor may inquire about any prior act of the accused which can
be described as criminal,12 degrading' 3 or reprehensible."'4
Analogous to the situation in which prior convictions are offered
for impeachment, some prior specific acts of misconduct arguably
will have occurred so long ago that opposing counsel may assert that
they are irrelevant to show the witness' present capacity for truth
telling. The majority of jurisdictions permitting the non-conviction
method of impeachment have deemed the question of remoteness
subject to the discretionary control of the trial judge.""5 In fact,
historic precedent exists for the position that the entire question of
cross-examination regarding prior non-convicted acts should be left
primarily to the discretion of the court.' 6 In addition to remoteness,
reasonable grounds to believe that the witness committed the criminal or degrading
act)..
99. Moore v. United States, 394 F.2d 818, 819 (5th Cir. 1968) (court declined
to allow a witness' veracity to be attacked by evidence that she had illegitimate
children), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1030 (1969); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 982
(Chadbourn rev. 1970).
100. Hug v. United States, 329 F.2d 475, 483 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
818 (1964); Pullman Co. v. Hall, 55 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1932).
101. FED. R. EVID. 608(b); see People v. Mitchell, 402 Mich. 506, 265 N.W.2d
163 (1978) (holding under MICH. R. EID. 608(b) that homosexual conduct is not
relevant to truthfulness).
102. State v. Chapman, 294 N.C. 407, 241 S.E.2d 667 (1978) (criminal acts);
State v. Brower, 289 N.C. 644, 224 S.E.2d 551 (1976).
103. State v. Garrison, 294 N.C. 270, 240 S.E.2d 377 (1978); State v. Foster,
293 N.C. 674, 239 S.E.2d 449 (1977); State v. Black, 283 N.C. 344, 196 S.E.2d 225
(1973).
104. State v. McLean, 294 N.C. 623, 242 S.E.2d 814 (1978); State v. Willis,
20 N.C. App. 43, 200 S.E.2d 408 (1973), aff'd, 285 N.C. 195, 204 S.E.2d 33 (1974).
105. See Shailer v. Bullock, 78 Conn. 65, 61 A. 65 (1905); State v. Locklear,
26 N.C. App. 300, 215 S.E.2d 859, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 248, 217 S.E.2d 672 (1975);
E. CLEARY, supra note 1, at § 42.
106. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 983 (3d ed. 1940). FED. R. EID. 608(b)
specifically qualifies the rule with the words "in the discretion of the court." Stans-
bury v. United States, 219 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1955). The North Carolina courts
rather consistently preface the rule with the words "within the discretion of the
trial court." State v. Williams, 292 N.C. 391, 233 S.E.2d 507 (1977); State v. Black,
283 N.C. 344, 196 S.E.2d 225 (1973).
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the court's discretion would come to bear on other issues including
probative value being outweighed by prejudicial effect, 07 relevancy
to the trait of credibility, 08 consummation of an undue amount of
time and distraction of the jury."9
C. REBUrAL
On occasion, the accused not only will take the stand in his own
behalf, opening the door to the criminal history discussed in the
preceding subsection, but he also will engage in what could be
termed "over testifying." This usually consists of general denials
that he does not now and has never engaged in this kind of criminal
activity. Although this may be a wise tactical maneuver by the
defense counsel, it does have the decided disadvantage of authoriz-
ing the prosecution to introduce the accused's prior criminal mis-
conduct on the ground that it is proper rebuttal."0
The most historic and familiar example of the rebuttal rule is
found in prosecutions where the accused claims that he did not have
the physical ability to have committed the crime."' The most fertile
area for the appearance of this particular basis for admitting the
accused's criminal history is drug prosecutions."'
107. See State v. Bullock, 28 N.C. App. 1, 220 S.E.2d 169 (1975), cert. denied,
289 N.C. 299, 222 S.E.2d 699 (1976); FED. R. EVID. 403; E. CLEARY, supra note 1,
at § 42.
108. State v. Foster, 293 N.C. 674, 239 S.E.2d 449 (1977) (any act which tends
to discredit his character and challenge his credibility); State v. Foster, 284 N.C.
259, 200 S.E.2d 782 (1973); FED. R. EVID. 403; 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 983
(Chadboum rev. 1970).
109. Robinson v. Atterbury, 135 Conn. 517, 66 A.2d 593 (1949); Corum v.
Comer, 256 N.C. 252, 123 S.E.2d 473 (1962); Deming v. Gainey, 95 N.C. 528 (1886);
FED. R. EVID. 403; E. CLEARY, supra note 1, at § 42.
110. State v. Breeze, 26 N.C. App. 48, 214 S.E.2d 802 (charge of larceny by
trick and defendant testified that he had refused to participate in the confidence
game; court properly permitted State rebuttal witness to testify as to similar
schemes attempted by defendant), cert. denied, 287 N.C. 665, 216 S.E.2d 908
(1975).
111. State v. Dawson, 278 N.C. 351, 180 S.E.2d 140 (1971) (in manslaughter
prosecution defendant testified that, due to injuries received in an earlier accident,
he was not physically able to kick victim; in rebuttal the prosecution was allowed
to have witness testify that he had been assaulted by accused during this period of
alleged disability).
112. State v. Johnson, 13 N.C. App. 323, 185 S.E.2d 423 (1971) (accused
denied knowledge of marijuana and tried to give impression that someone else had
placed it in his home; court permitted State's rebuttal witness to testify about
purchasing marijuana at defendant's home two weeks before the incident in ques-
tion).
22 [Vol. 1:1.
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One method of triggering the rebuttal rule, other than through
the scope of the accused's direct examination, is an Overly zealous
cross-examination of the prosecution witness. "13 Where, for example,
the defense elicits testimony from a witness on cross-examination
tending to show bias, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held
it proper for that witness to testify on redirect that the reason she
disliked the defendant was due to the fact that he had raped her."4
The earliest enunciation of this principle by the North Carolina
courts was in the following form:
A party cannot be allowed to impeach a witness on the cross-
examination by calling out evidence culpatory of himself and then
stop, leaving the opposing party without opportunity to have the
witness explain his conduct, and thus place it in an unobjectiona-
ble light if he can. In such case the opposing party has the right to
such explanation, even though it may affect adversely the party
who cross-examined. "1
V. DEFENSE TACTICS TO PRECLUDE
THE ADMISSION OF OR DIMINISH
THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE
ACCUSED'S CRIMINAL HISTORY
A. TACTICS TO EXCLUDE CRIMINAL HISTORY
1. Immateriality
The general rule excluding criminal history does so only when
the misconduct is offered to prove the accused's character or dispo-
sition for committing the kind of offense for which he is on trial. 116
Such evidence is not precluded when offered for some other purpose
including: intent, knowledge, identity and common plan or
scheme." 7 The foregoing dichotomy produces a situation in which
the defense invariably objects to criminal history as inadmissible
under the general exclusionary rule, and the prosecution responds
that it is offered for some purpose other than to prove bad character.
Once the prosecution has suggested one of these other purposes,
113. State v. Cates, 293 N.C. 462, 238 S.E.2d 465 (1977) (accused cross-
examined State's witness and intimated that reason witness accompanied accused
to victim's home was to kill the victim himself; on redirect the State's witness was
allowed to testify that he went with accused because accused had pistol whipped
him several years before).
114. State v. Patterson, 284 N.C. 190, 200 S.E.2d 16 (1973).
115. State v. Glenn, 95 N.C. 677 (1886).
116. See generally cases cited supra in note 5.
117. See supra note 6.
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the likely response of the defense would be that the offered purpose
is not material to the case.S"8 In order to understand when this re-
sponse is appropriate, the defense counsel must first have a firm
understanding of the distinction between materiality and relevancy.
Fact A may be offered in evidence for the purpose of proving the
existence of inference number one. If inference number one is not
an issue in the case, fact A would be immaterial and, consequently,
inadmissible. For example, suppose the defendant is being prose-
cuted for the crime of having carnal knowledge of a female under
twelve years of age. The prosecution introduces fact A (that the
accused and the prosecutrix had had prior sexual relations) for the
purpose of proving inference number one (that she consented to the
present sexual relations). Obviously, fact A is relevant to give rise
to inference number one in the foregoing hypothetical. However,
fact A is immaterial because it does not give rise to an inference that
is an ultimate issue in the case since the consent of this female is
immaterial in the prosecution for this crime.
When the prosecutor states, for example, that he is offering the
criminal history to prove intent, then operating under the foregoing
analysis the defense would attempt to persuade the court that the
now-charged crime has no prerequisite material intent."9 Similarly,
if the prosecution offers criminal history for the purpose of impeach-
ment, the defense will remind the court that until the accused takes
the witness stand in his own behalf credibility is not material.2 0
2. Irrelevancy
The second tactic of the defense is to argue that the proffered
criminal misconduct is not relevant to the purpose for which it is
offered. Such a tactic cannot be asserted convincingly unless the
defense counsel has a clear understanding of the applicable test of
relevancy. Suppose that D is charged with and prosecuted for mur-
der. Evidence is introduced that D was the beneficiary of an insur-
ance policy on the life of the victim. Fact A (D was the beneficiary
on the victim's life policy) is introduced to give rise to inference
number one (D is likely to have committed the crime). The attorney
for the defendant will argue that fact A leads as validly to inference
number two (being the insurance beneficiary does not indicate
guilt) as it does to inference number one (being the beneficiary does,
infer guilt). There have been two tests of relevancy employed to
118. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (concept of materiality is included within the scope
of relevancy).
119. See supra note 13.
120. See cases collected supra in note 70.
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resolve this dilemma. The first test, utilized by North Carolina, is
that fact A is relevant if there is any logical relationship between it
and the ultimate inference for which it is offered.' 2 In the foregoing
hypothetical this would mean that fact A (D was the beneficiary)
is relevant if it, in any way, gives rise to the inference that he is more
likely to have killed the victim. A second test, proposed by Professor
Wigmore, states that the evidence must have more than a minimum
degree of relevancy and must have a plus value. Applied to the
foregoing hypothetical, this test would work to the effect that fact
A (D was the beneficiary) is only relevant if it leads more to infer-
ence number one (D more likely murdered the victim) than to infer-
ence number two (D is not more likely to have murdered the vic-
tim).
Let us assume that the accused is charged with the crime of
transporting stolen vehicles across state lines. The prosecutor offers
testimony from a witness of an alleged offer by the accused to steal
and burn the witness' automobile in order to defraud the insurance
carrier. The defense objects that this is an impermissible use of prior
criminal history to prove criminal character. The prosecutor re-
sponds by alleging this to be a crime requiring a prerequisite knowl-
edge with this previous proposition being offered for the purpose of
proving such knowledge. 22 An objection likely will be heard from the
defense that this offer to bum an automobile is not relevant because
it does not give rise to an inference that the accused knew the
vehicle he drove across state lines was stolen. This will require a
decision from the trial judge as to whether this alleged proposition
has any logical tendency to prove the knowledge.tn This judicial
dilemma should be resolved in light of the following philosophy:
"Whether the requisite degree of relevancy exists is a judicial ques-
tion to be determined in light of the inevitable tendency of such
evidence to raise a legally spurious presumption of guilt in the
minds of the jurors.''2
121. State v. Braxton, 294 N.C. 446, 242 S.E.2d 769 (1978) (whether it tends
to shed any light on the subject of inquiry); State v. Bundridge, 294 N.C. 45, 239
S.E.2d 811 (1978) (any logical tendency, however slight, to prove fact in issue);
State v. Hugenberg, 34 N.C. App. 91, 237 S.E.2d 327, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 591,
238 S.E.2d 151 (1977); see FED. R. EvID. 401 (any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action).
122. See supra note 11.
123. See Bullard v. United States, 395 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1968).
124. State v. Fowler, 230 N.C. 470, 475, 53 S.E.2d 853, 856 (1949). While it is
a discretionary matter, a common ground of argued irrelevancy is remoteness. The
defense asserts tht the particular prior crime was committed by the accused so long
ago that it does not have probative value to give rise to the inference for which it
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3. Unfair Surprise, Misleading, Confusion,
Undue Prejudice and Waste of Time
The next objection of the defense to preclude the admission of
criminal history may come from the collection of objections which
find comprehensive expression in the Federal Rules of Evidence:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair surprise, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." 2 5
The most popular of these grounds of exclusion asserted against
the admission of prior crimes is an objection based upon the premise
that the probative value of the evidence is weak compared to the
likelihood of its playing upon the passions and prejudices of the
jury. 2 This objection not only effectuates the exclusion of prior
crimes, but, even if prior crimes are admissible, it also serves as a
basis for the accused to object to specific unnecessary details of such
offenses when these would only inflame the minds of the jurors.",
4. Lack of Good Faith and Information
Whenever the prosecutor cross-examines the accused about a
prior conviction or a prior criminal act for which there is no convic-
tion, either for impeachment or substantive purposes, the North
Carolina cases are replete with statements which indicate such a
question can be propounded only when based upon information and
asked in good faith. 2 s A prosecutor conceivably could question an
is offered. See State v. Locklear, 26 N.C. App. 300, 215 S.E.2d 859 (court admitting
two-year-old altercation between accused and victim as relevant to motive despite
remoteness objection), cert. denied, 288 N.C. 248, 217 S.E.2d 672 (1975).
125. FED. R. EVID. 403; see State v. Hugenberg, 34 N.C. App. 91, 237 S.E.2d
327 (recognizing objections of confusion, unfair surprise and unnecessary prolong.
ing of the trial), cert. denied, 293 N.C. 591, 238 S.E.2d 151 (1977).
126. State v. Braxton, 294 N.C. 446, 242 S.E.2d 769 (1978); State v. Bullock,
28 N.C. App. 1, 220 S.E.2d 169 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 299, 222 S.E.2d 699
(1976); State v. Stack, 12 N.C. App. 101, 182 S.E.2d 633 (1971). A second prong of
this particular objection is that the evidence has so little probative value that it
distracts the jury's attention from material matters. State v. Jenkins, 292 N.C. 179,
232 S.E.2d 648 (1977).
127. See State v. Whitney, 26 N.C. App. 460, 216 S.E.2d 439 (1975) (court
granted new trial because testimony included details which only could relate to
defendant's character and inflame the mind of the jury).
128. See generally cases collected supra in note 97; State v. Heard, 262 N.C.
599, 138 S.E.2d 243 (1964). Whether there is information and good faith is a matter
largely left in the trial judge's discretion. State v. Curry, 288 N.C. 660, 220 S.E.2d
545 (1975) (good faith); State v. Fountain, 282 N.C. 58, 191 S.E.2d 674 (1972).
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accused concerning unrelated criminal offenses which the prosecu-
tor actually has no factual basis to believe occurred. It would be-
hoove the defense counsel to object whenever he feels this is occur-
ring. 2 The maneuver of the defense to assure such a factual basis
would be to ask for a voir dire hearing to determine whether the
prosecutor's question is based upon fact and asked in good faith. It
is entirely permissible for the trial judge to conduct such a hear-
ing.130 The only weakness in the accused's calling for such a voir dire
hearing lies in the judicial pronouncement that such a procedure,
while it is permissible, is not required. 3'
B. TACTICS TO DIMINISH EFFECT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY
1. Limiting Instructions
The common justification for admitting prior criminal miscon-
duct is that it is admissible for some particular purpose other than
to prove the accused's bad character. 3 If requested by the defense
counsel, the trial judge should instruct the jury regarding the lim-
ited purpose for which the criminal history is admitted and warn
them not to consider it for any other purpose.' = Should the prosecu-
tor assert, for example, that he is offering the prior crime of the
accused to prove his motive for committing the now-charged
crime, 34 the defense should ask that the jury be instructed to con-
sider such evidence only as it relates to motive and that such proof
cannot be used to satisfy them as to the other elements of crime now
being prosecuted.35
Perhaps the most common application of this defense tactic
occurs where the prosecution seeks to impeach the accused by prior
conviction or prior criminal act for which there was no conviction. 3
Whenever this impeachment by criminal history occurs, the defense
should request that the jury be instructed that this evidence may
be used only for impeachment and that it does not constitute sub-
129. Young v. State, 363 So. 2d 1007 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978); see Annot., 3
A.L.R.3d 965 (1965).
130. State v. Heard, 262 N.C. 599, 138 S.E.2d 243 (1964).
131. State v. Gaiten, 277 N.C. 236, 176 S.E.2d 778 (1970).
132. See supra note 6.
133. State v. McClain, 282 N.C. 357, 193 S.E.2d 108 (1972) (trial judge in-
structed jury to consider such evidence only as it relates to the identity of the
defendant);. State v. Richardson, 36 N.C. App. 373, 243 S.E.2d 918 (1978); State
v. Newton, 25 N.C. App. 277, 212 S.E.2d 700 (1975).
134. See supra note 22.
135. State v. Fowler, 230 N.C. 470, 53 S.E.2d 853 (1949).
136. See supra notes 71 and 95.
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stantive evidence.'37 The burden clearly is on the defendant to ask
for such a limiting instruction, and failure to give that instruction
cannot constitute reversible error in the absence of a request by the
accused.'38
2. Explanation
A primary defense tactic used to diminish the prejudicial effect
of criminal history is to have the accused explain it away or bring
out those facts which indicate that the criminal act does not prove
that for which the prosecution offered it. The most common illustra-
tion of this maneuver is found where the accused has been im-
peached on cross-examination by his prior conviction. The im-
peached accused is entitled on redirect examination to explain any
such conviction which he admitted.'39 It would certainly be to his
advantage, for example, to explain that he had a pending appeal
from the conviction.' 0 The extent and scope of these explanations
are within the considerable discretion of the trial judge.' 4'
VI. CONCLUSION
The emphasis within this article has been upon the purposes for
which the accused's criminal history is admissible. These purposes
constitute exceptions to the rule which generally calls for the exclu-
sion of this form of character evidence. The future question to be
reckoned with by the North Carolina defense attorney is the extent
to which the courts will recognize additional purposes. Alert prose-
cutors may be expected to work for the expansion of both the scope
and number of these purposes in an effort to make the jury privy to
the accused's criminal history.
The better-reasoned view, strongly advocated by Dean Wig-
more,' 42 is that the present list of purposes is not exclusive and room
for expansion through the recognition of new purposes should be
allowed. These purposes will be based either upon the trial tactics
of the defense or upon the issues, regardless of the accused's actions
137. State v. Norkett, 269 N.C. 679, 153 S.E.2d 362 (1967); State v. Long, 20
N.C. App. 91, 200 S.E.2d 825 (1973).
138. See State v. Goodson, 273 N.C. 128, 159 S.E.2d 310 (1968).
139. State v. Sanders, 276 N.C. 598, 174 S.E.2d 487 (1970), rev'd, 403 U.S. 948
(1971); State v. Chandler, 30 N.C. App. 646, 228 S.E.2d 69 (1976).
140. State v. Waller, 11 N.C. App. 434, 181 S.E.2d 195, cert. denied, 279 N.C.
351, 182 S.E.2d 584 (1971).
141. State v. Chandler, 30 N.C. App. 646, 228 S.E.2d 69 (1976).
142. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 64 (3d ed. 1940).
[Vol. 1:1
28
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol1/iss1/1
1979] PRIOR CRIMEs As EVIDENCE 29
at trial."' Illustrative of this continuing expansion is the recent
recognition by the judiciary of North Carolina of new purposes
which, even now, defy categorization within the present article.'44
143. State v. Cates, 293 N.C. 462, 238 S.E.2d 465 (1977).
144. See State v. Felton, 283 N.C. 368, 196 S.E.2d 239 (1973) (rape victim
allowed to relate accused's boasting of another rape as relevant to prove that her
will to resist had been overcome by fear); State v. Staton, 33 N.C. App. 270, 234
S.E.2d 767 (State's witness who had talked with accused was allowed to testify that
he was a probation officer; defense objected that such proved accused's criminal
character, but court ruled it admissible for the purpose of placing the witness in
his setting in order to judge his credibility), cert. denied, 293 N.C. 257, 237 S.E.2d
539 (1977).
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